{"has_more":true,"total_items":52,"items":[{"vg_id":0,"published_date":"2019-05-15","journal":"Share of Market Securities Held by Mutual Funds in the U.S. in 2018, by Security Type, STATISTA","authors":[{"author_name":"M Szmigiera"}]},{"vg_id":0,"journal":"Effective use of governance rights requires firm-specific investigation and firm-specific activism, both of which are costly and will be undersupplied by institutional investors","volume":891,"authors":[{"author_name":"See Gilson"},{"author_name":"& Gordon"}]},{"vg_id":0,"published_date":2017,"journal":"Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV","volume":767,"title":"The firm-specific nature of the tradeoff between principal costs and agent costs is the reason that firms adopt a wide variety of governance structures, each of which offers a different division of control between investors and managers","authors":[{"author_name":"Zohar Goshen"},{"author_name":"& Richard Squire"}]},{"vg_id":0,"published_date":1965,"journal":"73 J. POL. ECON","volume":110,"page_from":58,"title":"stating that a fundamental premise that underlies the market for corporate control is the correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of a company's shares); see also","authors":[{"author_name":"John C Coffee"}],"page_to":59}]}